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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no magic formula for sustained economic development in
poor countries. Strategies that succeed in one country may not be appro-
priate in another. Yet there are several broad similarities across the
countries that have been most successful in achieving development over
the past forty years. This Article takes a very broad overview of eco-
nomic development in low-income countries over this period and makes
three basic points.
First, progress in economic development around the world between
1960 and 2000 was greater than is often assumed. Many people believe
that development success has been confined to a few countries in East
and Southeast Asia, with little progress elsewhere. In fact, more than 20
countries that were relatively poor in 1960 and that account for nearly
half the world's population can claim reasonable success since then, with
significant increases in income, improvements in health, and advances in
education. The average real incomes of these countries, for example,
more than tripled in real terms over just two generations, with significant
increases in life expectancy and literacy rates.
Second, while the specifics varied across each country (and within
each country during the process of development), there were several
common elements across the development strategies pursued by the most
* Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C. and for-
mer Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
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successful developing countries. Four key elements stand out: macro-
economic and political stability, significant investments in health and
education, policies to support private sector development, and strong
governance. These four "pillars of development," in one form or another,
have been the cornerstones of the growth strategies of essentially all of
the successful countries.
Third, although the policies and institutions of the low-income coun-
tries are central to long-term growth, the poorest countries cannot
achieve sustained development without the support and cooperation of
the international community. To expand the breadth and accelerate the
pace of development in low-income countries, rich countries must im-
prove both the quantity and quality of foreign assistance. They must also
reduce trade distortions and further open their markets to the products
sold by low-income countries.
II. SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT 1960-2000:
MORE THAN EAST ASIA
By most estimates, during the last half of the 20th century there were
significant declines in the share of the world's population living in pov-
erty, along with substantial improvements in health and education. While
precise estimates differ, several analyses suggest that the share of the
world's population living in extreme poverty fell by between one-quarter
and one-half between 1960 and 2000.' Bourguignon and Morrisson, for
example, find the share of the world's population living in extreme pov-
erty fell from 44% to 23.7% between 1960 and 1992; while the share
living in poverty fell sharply, the absolute number living in poverty de-
clined only slightly.2 Around the world, life expectancy increased from
50 to 67 years, while infant mortality rates fell from 119 to 56 per 1,000
births. Compared to previous periods in world economic history, these
advances over a 40-year period are huge.
There is a widespread belief that these remarkable gains in human
welfare were confined to East and Southeast Asia, with very few coun-
tries outside the region achieving any success. The Asian "tigers,"
indeed, are the most prominent and well-known of the success stories.
Following the rebuilding of Japan after World War II, growth took off in
1. See, e.g., SURJIT S. BHALLA, IMAGINE THERE IS NO COUNTRY: POVERTY, INEQUAL-
ITY, AND GROWTH IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (2002); Xavier Sala-I-Martin, The
Disturbing "Rise" of Global Income Inequality, NBER Working Paper no. 8904 (2002); Fran-
cois Bourguignon & Catherine Morrisson, Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 727 (2002).
2. Bourguignon & Morrisson, supra note 1.
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Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, with real incomes increasing
(incredibly) by more than seven-fold in these four economies between
1960 and 2000. The rapid growth spread to several countries in South-
east Asia, with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
experiencing a four-fold increase in real incomes over the same period.
And, of course, China's growth explosion after 1979 is one of the most
important changes in the world economy during the last century.
However, development success has not been limited to this region. In
fact, more than a dozen other countries have achieved more modest, but
still important, progress. Table 1 shows 21 countries that were relatively
poor in 1960 and achieved economic growth per capita of at least 2.2%
per person between 1960 and 2000. I use 2.2% annual per capita growth
as a baseline measure of "success" because that growth rate equals the
fastest per capita growth rate ever achieved over a 40-year period by to-
day's world economic leaders (excluding Japan): the United States,
Germany, France, and Britain. Surely any country that has outperformed
the best economic growth performance of the United States over a rela-
tively sustained period (40 years) deserves to be considered at least a
reasonable success. Note that this is not to argue that some of these
countries could not have done better-surely they could have. Moreover,
it is true that the more recent success stories had advantages that the U.S.
and European leaders did not have, especially the ability to import and
adapt technologies and governance structures from richer countries. The
point is a simpler one: from the perspective of the broad scope of human
history, a growth rate of 2.2% sustained over 40 years, whatever its ori-
gins, translates into enormous gains in human welfare that should be
considered at least a reasonable development success.
A growth rate of 2.2% per capita over 40 years means that average
individual incomes in these countries more than doubled (more pre-
cisely, increased by 140%) during this period. In fact, for this group of
countries as a whole, the increase was much larger, as were the accom-
panying gains in other indicators of development. Table 1 shows that for
this group of 21 countries as a whole, average real incomes more than
quintupled, life expectancy rose from 48 to 66 years, infant mortality fell
from 128 to 39 per 1,000 births, and illiteracy rates fell from 49% to
21%. This group of countries includes all the usual countries from East
and Southeast Asia (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, China, Thailand), along
with several others such as Botswana (the second fastest growing coun-
try in the world over the period), Mauritius, Egypt (where average
incomes more than tripled), India, the Dominican Republic, Tunisia, and
several others. These relatively rapidly growing countries were hardly
small and insignificant: their combined population tops three billion,
1205Summer 2005]
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constituting half of the world's population. The large population share is
driven mostly by the inclusion of China and India in the group, but sev-
eral other large countries are also on the list, including Indonesia, Egypt,
Turkey, and Brazil. Surprisingly, even Pakistan makes the list, where
average real income has nearly tripled, life expectancy has surged from
44 to 63 years, and illiteracy has fallen from 79% to 56%. Pakistan
surely faces enormous problems, but its record on these basic indicators
of welfare exceeds the performance ever recorded over 40 years by the
United States or Europe. More broadly, there is no time in world history
where such a large share of the global population made such important
progress over a comparable period of time.
Of course, these gains were the average for the people living in these
21 countries. For some individuals and their families, the gains in in-
come, health, and education were much larger. For others, they were
much smaller. One potential worry would be if the gains of the richer
elements of these societies came at the expense of the poor. I have not
yet had the opportunity to explore the evidence for this very important
question for this group of countries. Previous research indicates that
economic growth rates tend to be relatively uniform across income levels
within particular countries; that is, the growth rate of the incomes of the
poorest 20% of the population in a given country tends to be approxi-
mately equal to the income growth rate of the population as a whole.'
This rapid growth experience undoubtedly left many people behind,
as in the United States and Europe. While not all of the three billion
people in these 21 countries benefited, the majority undoubtedly accrued
significant gains in welfare. Even if not everyone gained, there is little
doubt that poverty has been substantially reduced for billions of people
around the world during the past 40 years, both in and out of Asia.
These successes are not a reason to declare victory in the war on
global poverty, or for the world to feel self-satisfied-far from it. But
they provide clear evidence against the view that development efforts in
recent decades have met with nothing but failure outside of Asia and
hope for continued development in the future. The process of economic
development is long and difficult. The challenge going forward is two-
fold. The first task is to sustain economic growth and poverty reduction
in these countries. The second is to find ways to spread this achievement
to a wider circle of low-income countries, some of which face enormous
obstacles in initiating the process of growth and development.
3. John Gallup, Steven Radelet & Andrew Warner, Economic Growth and the Income
of the Poor Harvard Institute for International Development (1998); David Dollar & Aart
Kraay, Growth is Good for the Poor, 7 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 195 (2002).
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III. DOMESTIC POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS
There is no single recipe for success in development. Each country
faces different circumstances and obstacles and has varied endowments
(positive and negative) of geography, resources, human capital, and other
important elements. The strategy that worked in small, urban, resource-
poor, strategically located Singapore is unlikely to be the optimal path
for rural, resource-rich, landlocked Botswana. The highest priorities for
one country are not the same as for another; moreover, the highest priori-
ties and challenges within a country change over time and during the
course of development.
Yet while the specifics differ across countries, the most successful
countries share some central characteristics in their paths to sustained
growth. In particular, there are four key elements common to successful
development which can be thought of as pillars for an effective devel-
opment strategy.
A. Macroeconomic and Political Stability
Economic and political instability undermine investment and growth
and are especially hard on the poor, who are least able to protect them-
selves against volatility. Relatively low budget deficits over time (with
corresponding high rates of government saving), prudent monetary pol-
icy, appropriate exchange rates, suitable financial markets (depending on
the stage of development), and sustainable foreign borrowing are the key
elements to macroeconomic stability. Such stability reduces risk for in-
vestors, whether they are multinational conglomerates or coffee farmers
considering planting more trees. A broad tax base with modest tax rates
allows governments to fund important social and economic programs
while keeping budgets in balance. The particular mix changes over time:
the poorest countries can appropriately rely on aid grants and conces-
sional loans, then build their tax base and reduce aid flows as the
economy grows. Sustained political stability is equally important; all of
the success stories were politically stable for long periods of time. Al-
though some countries experienced periods of instability, they were for
the most part short-lived. Collier and others point out the insidious nega-
tive cycle of civil war in low-income countries, in which poverty
increases the risk of conflict and conflict undermines growth and en-
trenches poverty.4
4. Paul Collier, On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, 51 OXFORD ECON. PA-
PERS 168 (1999); World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,
(2003).
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B. Substantial Investment in Health and Education
Countries with healthier, better-educated populations record faster
economic growth, productivity gains, and poverty reduction. Indeed,
there appears to be a positive cycle between growth and investments in
health and education: such investments lead to faster growth and higher
incomes, which in turn enable larger investments in health and educa-
tion. It is incorrect to believe, as some do, that better health and
education are simply byproducts of the development process-they are
key inputs as well.
East Asian countries made significant investments in primary educa-
tion, especially of girls, which enabled their populations to become
healthier and much more productive members of the workforce. This
development in turn helped East Asian countries achieve a higher, more
sustainable standard of living. Similarly, investments in basic health have
very high economic rates of return.' Radelet, Sachs, and Lee found that
the difference in life expectancy at birth in 1965 in East/Southeast Asia
(55 years) and sub-Saharan Africa (41 years) was associated with a dif-
ference in per capita growth rates of 1.3 percentage points per year over
a 30-year period-about one-third of the total difference in growth.6 Ac-
cessible basic health care facilities, clean water and sanitation, disease
control programs, and strong reproductive and maternal and child health
programs help countries lengthen life expectancy and improve worker
productivity.
The quality of service delivery is just as important as quantity. It is
not enough to build schools and increase enrollment rates; teachers have
to show up, be motivated, and have adequate basic supplies (e.g., text-
books) in order to do their job.' The development community has
recently refocused attention on the importance of basic health and educa-
tion in the development process after years of imbalanced emphasis on
macroeconomic policies.
C. Private Sector-led Growth, Focused on
Integration with the World Economy
Development cannot happen in the absence of sustained growth of
private sector enterprise. A dynamic private sector-whether small
holder family farms or large manufacturing enterprises-is key to job
5. David Bloom, David Canning & Dean Jamison, Health, Wealth, and Welfare, 41
FIN. & DEV 10 (2004).
6. Steven Radelet, Jeffrey Sachs & Jong-Wha Lee, Economic Growth in Asia, 15
INT'L ECON. J. 1 (2001).
7. World Bank, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor
People (2004).
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creation and income generation, which in turn is central to poverty re-
duction. There is great debate on how best to create a dynamic private
sector in low-income countries, particularly regarding the appropriate
role for industrial and trade policies; there is no longer much debate
about the centrality of a dynamic private sector. Although the details of
their strategies have differed, most of the successful countries have
stimulated both agricultural production and labor-intensive manufactured
and service exports. In most cases, competitive firms that are fully inte-
grated into the global economy have played a prominent role, importing
new technologies, expanding investment opportunities, and creating new
jobs. Key elements for most of the successful countries include:
Robust Agricultural Sector. Although rapid economic growth
leads to a decline in the relative importance of agriculture, a
healthy agricultural sector is critical for poverty reduction and
long-term growth, as well as for establishing a strong manu-
facturing sector. The seeming paradox-which in reality is no
paradox at all-is that strong investments and policies are
needed in agriculture even as it declines in economic impor-
tance. A healthy agricultural sector with rapid productivity
gains allows workers to shift to other activities in manufactur-
ing and services with even higher productivity, which in turn
supports long-term growth. In the most successful countries,
governments removed price distortions so that farmgate prices
were kept close to world market levels and removed artificial
barriers and non-market institutions that limited farmers'
choices and opportunities. Most farmers had reasonable ac-
cess to seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides (and in many cases
governments subsidized fertilizer to ensure that farmers used
it in appropriate quantities). A key to agricultural growth and
reduction of rural poverty was construction of feeder roads so
that farmers could get their crops to market and bring in fertil-
izer and other inputs. Agricultural research allowed new seed
varieties to be adapted and facilitated the use of agricultural
products in new markets (e.g., Malaysia's research into new
uses for rubber trees, such as furniture). And, of course, the
Green Revolution remains perhaps the best example of re-
search into new technologies (largely financed by donor
agencies). This research produced huge payoffs in new varie-
ties of seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs that led to dramatic
increases in agricultural production in Asia. This increase in
agricultural production, in turn, was at the core of the so-
called "Asian Miracle."
1209Summner 2005]
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* Competitive labor-intensive manufactured and service ex-
ports. Most (although not all) of the successful countries
adopted strategies for diversifying from primary products to
labor-intensive manufactured exports. Important elements in-
cluded low (or zero) tariffs on imported inputs (especially
capital goods), access to efficient port facilities, reliable
roads, power, and other infrastructure, and a customs service
that did not unduly delay or add to the cost of shipments. Im-
portantly, the successful countries did not leave export
diversification purely to the markets: governments in each
country introduced well-run institutions, such as export proc-
essing zones (EPZs) and bonded warehouse systems, to
facilitate exports.! Governments recognized broad areas in
which firms were likely to be globally competitive (e.g., tex-
tiles, basic electronics, food processing, and data entry
activities via satellite) and created an environment that inves-
tors saw as reliable, secure, and competitive. To do so, they
examined markets from the perspective of the firm and at-
tempted to eliminate obstacles that undermined firm
competitiveness, such as license requirements, slow and cor-
rupt customs administration, high tariff rates, and poor
infrastructure. In most cases, they did not try to solve these
problems for the whole economy at once, but rather created
an enclave (e.g., through an EPZ) where at least some firms
could be competitive and then worked to see the enclave
spread throughout the economy over time.
This strategy is not the same as "industrial targeting," in
which government officials pick specific firms to receive spe-
cial assistance and subsidies from the government (this
strategy was tried in some-not all-of the successful coun-
tries and had mixed results). Rather, the enclave approach
recognizes sectors in which firms could be competitive and
then works to provide a strong enabling environment for the
sector as a whole. This strategy was used in various forms
throughout East Asia, as well as in Mauritius, Tunisia, the
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and several other countries.
Note that these countries were most successful in areas that
were broadly consistent with their comparative advantage (la-
8. A bonded warehouse is a firm that puts up a bond in lieu of paying import duties on
inputs for exports. The bond is claimed only if duties become payable (e.g., if the firm fails to
export). This method minimizes the need for cash transactions. Unlike an EPZ, bonded firms
can locate anywhere.
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bor-intensive manufactures) and much less successful in areas
far from their comparative advantage (more capital-intensive
activities). In other words, government made markets work
better (e.g., inside an EPZ) instead of pushing against basic
market forces.
D. Strong Institutions for Governance
The most effective governments established institutions that helped
facilitate (rather than hinder) strong economic management, effective
social programs, and a robust private sector. Governance in the most rap-
idly growing countries varied widely from very effective (Singapore and
Botswana) to more mixed (Indonesia and Thailand), but was generally
better than in most developing countries. In the rapidly growing Asian
countries, government financial institutions, including the central bank
and the budget authorities in the ministry of finance, were mostly capa-
ble. Most governments substantially improved their customs clearance
procedures over time (at one point, Indonesia essentially privatized its
customs clearance process), and levels of corruption, on average, were
lower than in other developing countries (although they were high in
several of the countries). Importantly, there was much less corruption
and red tape in the most vibrant sectors of the economy, especially in the
institutions working with manufactured exports (e.g., in the EPZs and
duty exemption offices).
Many of the most successful countries also developed a small cadre
of highly trained and effective economic technocrats who guided eco-
nomic policymaking. Indonesia's "Berkeley Mafia," for example, was a
small group of economists trained (mainly) at the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley starting in the late 1950s-when Indonesia was still
extremely poor, unstable, and unintegrated with the world economy-
who went on to hold key positions from the early 1970s through the mid-
1990s and spearheaded that country's rapid development. Similar groups
of technocrats could be found in the other successful Asian countries, as
well as some countries outside the region, such as Chile. Importantly,
national leaders protected these economic decisionmakers from political
pressures that might have undermined difficult decisions. This made the
decisionmakers more effective in macroeconomic management and in
introducing reforms that affected vested interests.
In considering these broad components of economic management,
three further points should be emphasized. First, the most successful
countries did not get everything right all at once. South Korea and Tai-
wan, for example, achieved extraordinary development success during
the past forty years, but they did not solve all of their problems right
Summer 2005]
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away. In both countries there are still weak institutions, problems with
corruption, and some specific markets that do not work well, but gov-
ernments were able to put into place the most important changes that
lead to remarkable growth and poverty reduction despite these weak-
nesses. This approach is quite different from the World Bank's
"Comprehensive Development Framework" (CDF), in which countries
are urged to tackle a wide range of development problems essentially all
at once.9 None of the successful countries followed the Bank's CDF
There are two basic problems with the CDF approach. First, because of
capacity constraints (especially the number of capable senior staff) it is
not possible to address all major problems simultaneously; trying to do
so runs the risk of not dealing effectively with any problem. Second,
some tasks (such as developing infrastructure throughout the country,
building a strong judicial system, or training more staff) take many years
to complete. Thus, the successful countries tended to focus on solving
enough problems for at least part of the economy to begin sustained
economic growth. The concept of an export enclave is consistent with
this approach: get one sector of the economy functioning well and then
spread it over time. Shang-Jin Wei has proposed a similar approach for
governance.'0 He suggests that countries establish a Special Governance
Zone (SGZ), a geographically limited area within a country in which the
government introduces a comprehensive package of civil service re-
forms, redefines the role of the government in the economy, strengthens
the rule of law, and enhances citizen's voice.
Second, priorities change during the course of development. Intro-
ducing a sophisticated financial and banking system may be the highest
priority for a middle income country that is tapping into global financial
markets, but it is likely to be a much lower priority for the very poorest
countries that are concentrating on feeding their population and deliver-
ing basic services. Developing an export processing zone may be
important at initial stages of development, but should phase out over
time as development proceeds. Investments in increasing agricultural
productivity should be the highest priority for some countries, but the
importance of agriculture naturally falls as development proceeds. Thus,
while the four broad policy areas outlined above are fairly robust, the
precise details vary across countries and change over time within coun-
tries.
9. World Bank, supra note 7.
10. Shang-JinWei, Special Governance Zone: A Practical Entry-Point for a Winnable
Anti-Corruption Program, BROOKINGS ECON. PAPERS (2000), at http://www.brookings.edu/
views/papers/wei/20000924.htm.
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Third, the process of development is much more difficult in some
countries than others. Landlocked countries that are isolated from major
markets (and thus facing much higher transport costs), countries with
high disease burdens (e.g., malaria, tuberculosis, or AIDS), and those
with very low agricultural productivity (such as countries in the midst of
the Sahara desert) all face more difficult obstacles than other countries.
Intel will never build a factory in Rwanda, where the nearest port is hun-
dreds of miles away over difficult terrain, even if the country's policies
and institutions are strong. Niger-landlocked in the middle of the Sa-
hara-has far fewer economic options than Indonesia no matter what it
does. The potential for sustained economic growth is much lower in
these countries than in countries with lesser obstacles.
Empirical evidence suggests the importance of the four broad ele-
ments outlined above in distinguishing fast-growing from slow-growing
economies. Table 2 is drawn from Radelet, Sachs, and Lee, who estimate
the relationship between growth in real per capita GDP and 12 inde-
pendent variables for 78 countries around the world (rich and poor)_
between 1965 and 1990." The table does not show the results of the es-
timation per se, but rather a "growth accounting" exercise based on the
estimation results that shows the contribution of each of the variables to
the differences in grow rates between East and Southeast Asia and other
regions of the world (South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica). For example, South Asia's average growth rate over the period was
2.9 percentage points per year lower than East and Southeast Asia's
growth rate (as shown at the top of the first column). South Asia's lower
government savings rate-a broad indicator of macroeconomic policy-
accounted for 0.4 percentage points of the difference. Lower levels of
education accounted for 0.2 percentage points of slower growth. Much
lower life expectancy in South Asia (49 years in 1965 as opposed to 56
years in South and Southeast Asia) was associated with slower growth of
0.5 percentage points. South Asia was much less open to trade, one ele-
ment of a robust private sector, and by this estimate that stance slowed
growth by 1.2 percentage points per year relative to East and Southeast
Asia. Finally, poorer institutional quality'2 in South Asia slowed growth
by 0.5 percentage points. Altogether, these variables accounted for 2.8
11. Radelet, Sachs & Lee, supra note 6.
12. The institutional quality index is drawn and updated from Keefer & Knack (1995),
which in turn is based on data from Political Risk Services' International Country Risk Guide.
The index is an average of five survey-based indicators of institutional quality including (i) the
perceived efficiency of government bureaucracy, (ii) the extent of corruption, (iii) efficacy of
the rule of law, (iv) the extent of expropriation risk, and (v) the perceived risk of repudiation
of contracts by the government. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic
Performance: Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL.
207 (1995); Political Risk Services, International Country Risk Guide.
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percentage points of slower growth in Asia--essentially all of the actual
difference of 2.9 percentage points.
IV. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
There is little question that the main responsibility for accelerating
development lies with the governments of poor countries themselves.
These governments must put in place appropriate policies and institu-
tional frameworks and make the sometimes difficult decisions necessary
to ensure full implementation. However, poor countries, especially the
poorest countries, cannot achieve sustained economic development and
poverty reduction without the cooperation and assistance of the interna-
tional community. World leaders from both rich and poor countries
recognized the need for a new two-way partnership at the International
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in
March 2001. Heads of state attending the conference, including U.S.
President George Bush, adopted the "Monterrey Consensus," which con-
tains commitments by all countries to help low-income countries achieve
the "Millennium Development Goals," a series of specific targets aimed
at substantially reducing global poverty by 2015."3 As part of the Con-
sensus, the industrialized countries committed to action in a range of
areas, including official development assistance (ODA), trade (especially
in improving market access and reducing agricultural subsidies), invest-
ment, and debt relief.
A. Official Development Assistance
Donor commitments at Monterrey came in two parts. First, donors
committed to increasing the quantity of aid. The Consensus reaffirmed
the international community's goal, first made in the late 1960s, of ODA
flows reaching 0.7% of donor GNP. Specifically, the heads of state
agreed to "urge developed countries that have not done so to make con-
crete efforts towards the target of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP)
as ODA to developing countries."1 4 Current global aid falls woefully
short of that level, amounting to an average of about 0.25% of donor
GDP in 2004. As shown in Table 3, the United States, while providing
the largest amount of ODA of any donor country, gives the second
smallest amount as a share of its income. U.S. ODA was just 0.16% of
US income in 2004, just slightly more than Italy. Global ODA levels fell
13. The text of the Monterrey Consensus can be found at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
0302finalMonterreyConsensus.pdf.
14. ld. T42.
1214 [Vol. 26:1203
Supporting Sustained Economic Development
sharply in the early 1990s before starting to rebound in 1997. Donors on
average provided aid equivalent to 0.33% of their income in the late
1980s, but the figure now is about one-quarter lower. In July 2005 the
leaders of the G-8 pledged to double aid to Africa by 2010, but it re-
mains to be seen whether or not they will meet this commitment. The
fall in donor disbursements is reflected in a sharp decline in recipients by
low-income countries: aid per capita in Africa fell from $34 to $21 per
African between 1990 and 2001.5
Second, donors committed to improving the quality of aid. The re-
cord on aid effectiveness is mixed at best. Some aid programs have been
highly effective (such as programs to increase child immunization or to
fight river blindness) while other aid programs have had little effect.
Some aid programs can even damage recipients by distorting prices, en-
couraging corruption, or helping to sustain ineffective governments.
Recent research has found that on average, aid aimed most directly at
enhancing growth (such as to build infrastructure or to support agricul-
ture) has stimulated growth, but it has not done so in all countries.1 6 The
Monterrey Consensus acknowledges that donors must significantly im-
prove the way they deliver aid to make it more effective. There are many
ways that donors can improve the quality of aid. 17 The key issues can be
summarized as follows:
Improve the allocation of aid. There is a growing consensus
that ODA is most effective in reducing poverty and support-
ing economic growth when it is aimed at countries with the
deepest poverty and with strong policies and institutions that
support economic development. Aid given for political pur-
poses to countries with poor governance-such as for Cold
War allies-has had little development effect, whereas aid
provided to countries with better governance and a commit-
ment to strong development policies-such as Korea,
Botswana, or Thailand-has had a stronger impact. Donors
have made some progress in improving the allocation of aid
in recent years, but much greater progress is possible.
" Reduce the amount of "tied" aid. Most donors still require
that significant amounts of aid be spent on goods and services
15. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2003 (2003)
[hereinafter UNDP].
16. Michael Clemens, Steven Radelet & Rikhil Bhavnani, Counting Chickens When
They Hatch: The Short Term Effect of Aid on Growth, Center for Global Development Work-
ing Paper no. 44 (2004).
17. Steven Radelet, Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals, Center
for Global Development (2004).
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purchased in the donor country itself. This practice reduces
the flexibility of aid, and by some estimates, adds 15-30% to
the costs of aid delivery. Reducing the amount of tied aid
would increase the amount of goods and services that could
be purchased for a given quantity of aid, thereby improving
its effectiveness.
" Improve donor coordination and harmonization. Almost
every donor has its own project design system, monitoring
mechanisms, and reporting requirements. Lack of donor co-
ordination puts a heavy burden on recipient countries, which
can be swamped with countless donor "missions" and endless
paperwork. According to the World Bank, some recipient
countries have as many as 800 donor-funded activities started
each year, host more than 1,000 donor missions, and prepare
over 2,400 progress reports. 8 The Bush administration's two
new aid programs, the Millennium Challenge Account and the
AIDS Emergency Plan, may add to donor harmonization
problems by creating new systems on top of existing ones.
* Better align aid delivery with the realities on the ground in
different kinds of recipient countries. Aid delivery mecha-
nisms should differ significantly between well-governed and
poorly governed countries. For example, in well-governed
countries, donors should provide more of their aid as long-
term commitments for budget support to the central govern-
ment, whereas in poorly governed countries, smaller, shorter-
term projects implemented by non-government organizations
(NGOs) are more appropriate. Donors must hone much more
differentiated strategies to match the particular circumstances
of the recipient, some of which will require significant shifts
in donor organizations.' 9
B. Trade
Trade policies in rich countries are highly discriminatory against the
major products produced in poor countries, especially textiles and agri-
culture. Rich countries continually urge poor countries to adopt more
liberal trade policies, while the rich countries themselves restrict access
to their own markets. The structure of tariffs and quotas in high income
countries restrict trade much more from poor countries than from other
18. See World Bank, Aid Harmonization for Increased Development Effectiveness,
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/harmonization/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
19. Radelet, supra note 17.
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rich countries. Further opening of markets in high income countries
would provide substantially increased economic opportunities for pro-
ducers in developed countries. Estimates of the precise impacts vary, but
most studies suggest that just the static gains (assuming changes in
prices but no change in market structures) would be similar in size to
current levels of foreign aid. 20 Two actions, in particular, warrant atten-
tion:
Reduce tariffs. The United States, Europe, and Japan tend to
apply higher tariffs to the products that poor countries pro-
duce than on the products rich countries produce. The average
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) tariff on manufactured goods from low-income
countries is about four times higher than on manufactured
goods from rich countries. For example, Bangladesh exports
about $2.4 billion to the United States each year and pays an
average tariff of around 14%, while France exports $30 bil-
lion and pays just 1% in tariffs.2'
* Reduce export subsidies. OECD agricultural subsidies amount
to more than $300 billion per year. These subsidies give farm-
ers in wealthy countries a significant advantage over their
competitors from low-income countries. They also encourage
global overproduction, which lowers world prices and reduces
profits for exporters from low-income countries. For example,
U.S. cotton subsidies are three times larger than the entire
U.S. foreign aid budget and impose significant costs on cotton
producers in some of the poorest countries in the world, in-
cluding Burkina Faso and Mali. Subsidies for groundnuts,
sugar, dairy products, beef, and other products have similar
impacts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Sustained economic development depends on, in the first instance,
sensible policies and good governance in the low-income countries
themselves. A combination of macroeconomic stability, investments in
health and education, a supportive environment for private enterprise, and
strong institutions are the key elements of an effective development strat-
egy. The precise details, however, will differ across countries and within
countries over time; there is no one recipe with universal application. In
20. UNDP, supra note 15.
21. Id.
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this regard, donor prescriptions are at times too precise and inflexible for
local conditions.
Strong policies and institutions, however, are not sufficient in and of
themselves to assure sustained development. The international commu-
nity can support development through more and better foreign assistance
and by opening their markets further to goods and services produced in
poor countries. While development remains a significant challenge, there
is reason for hope: the welfare of billions of people in some of the poor-
est countries in the world has improved significantly in recent decades.
The challenges going forward are to continue the process of develop-
ment in these countries and to spread the gains from development to
those that so far have achieved much less success.
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TABLE 2
CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN
EAST/SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VARIOUS REGIONS, 1965-1990
(PERCENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE)
Contribution of Each Variable to the Difference in Per
Capita Growth Relative to East/Southeast Asia
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America
Policies, Institutions, and Human Capital -2.8 -3.4 -1.8
Government Savings Rate -0.4 -0.1 -0.3
Adult education levels -0.2 -0.4 -0.1
Life Expectancy -0.5 -1.3 0.1
Openness -1.2 -1.2 -1.0
Institutions -0.5 -0.4 -0.5
Other Factors 0.3 -0.6 -2.1
Initial GDP per capita 0.5 1.0 -1.2
Natural Resources Exports/GDP 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Landlocked 0.0 -0.3 -0.1
Tropics 0.5 -0.2 0.0
Coastline/land area -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Growth in Working Age Population -0.3 0.1 -0.2
Growth in Total Population -0.2 -0.7 -0.1
Difference in:
Predicted Growth -2.5 -3.9 -3.8
Actual Growth -2.9 -4.0 -3.9
Note: The ten economies in our sample from the East/Southeast Asian region are Hong Kong
PRC, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Papua
New Guinea.
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TABLE 3
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISBURSEMENTS
FROM MAJOR DONORS
$ million Percent of GDP
2004 2004 1987-1991 1992-1996
Australia 1,465 0.25 0.38 0.33
Austria 691 0.24 0.18 0.18
Belgium 1,452 0.41 0.44 0.36
Canada 2,537 0.26 0.46 0.41
Denmark 2,025 0.84 0.92 1.02
Finland 655 0.35 0.65 0.4
France 8,475 0.42 0.6 0.58
Germany 7,497 0.28 0.4 0.33
Greece 464 0.23 - 0.15
Ireland 586 0.39 0.18 0.25
Italy 2,484 0.15 0.35 0.25
Japan 8,859 0.19 0.31 0.26
Luxembourg 241 0.85 0.23 0.37
Netherlands 4,235 0.74 0.93 0.81
New Zealand 210 0.23 0.24 0.23
Norway 2,200 0.87 1.12 0.97
Portugal 1,028 0.63 0.23 0.28
Spain 2,547 0.26 0.16 0.25
Sweden 2,704 0.77 0.9 0.91
Switzerland 1,379 0.37 0.32 0.36
United Kingdom 7,836 0.36 0.3 0.3
United States 18,999 0.16 0.19 0.14
Total 78,568 0.25 0.33 0.29
Source: OECD
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